April 5th - Jawdat
An interview with Jawdat Al-Obaidi, former member of the Iraqi opposition, on is time in the resistance, the felling of the Saddam statue and how he feels about the situation now.
“I was one of the leaders of the uprising in 1991 in the town of Hilla. I had to leave in 1992 with my wife and children and go north to Erbil,” Jawdat Al-Obaidi began his story. “The uprising failed because we were not organised and because the US government under George Bush promised to help us but then supported Saddam to suppress the uprising.
“I joined the Iraqi opposition in the north, organising in secret political cells until 1996 when I was captured after the unsuccessful uprising. We asked the US forces who were operating in the north to provide air cover for us because we could take the cities but we couldn’t hold them without air cover because they had given helicopters to the Iraqi government.
“They promised us air cover and we made a successful attack on the Republican Guard at Kirkuk but they did not give us the air cover. Saddam’s army counter attacked, surrounded and seized the city of Erbil. It was a terrible day. We lost about two hundred resistance fighters. I was captured by the intelligence services on November 25th 1996.
“The first six months in jail I was tortured. The two years in jail were very bad to me because there were bad psychological conditions and bad food. The Red Cross elped a lot, tracking me from jail to jail, keeping a file on me, asking about my situation, bringing me letters from my family. They arranged a visit with my wife and brought me books and clothes and toiletries. There were some procedures but they were allowed access to me.”
Released on July 7th 1998, after 20 months in prison, Jawdat and his family crossed the border into Syria on foot, a twelve hour walk, then travelled by car and bus from the first village into Damascus, where he claimed political asylum to the US. Several of the detainees from the 1996 uprising were released at the same time in some kind of amnesty. “I was not a criminal. I was a politician. I was not charged with any crime.”
Arriving in the US, he studied English and computing part time and Portland Community College and worked for a computer company for a year and a half before setting up his own computer business with his younger brother who left Iraq with him.
Despite the double betrayal by the US, when he heard about the Free Iraq Force through the e mail and telephone network of Iraqi opposition members, he volunteered for the exile militia which would train in Hungary and travel into Iraq with the US troops. “It was a different situation from 1991 and 1996. It was their decision to enter Iraq then so I believed they would carry it through, unlike the other times when it was our decision and we asked for their support.”
On April 9th they drove into Baghdad on tanks, making straight for Firdos Square and the Saddam statue next to the Palestine Hotel which then housed the entire international press. “The army and Republican Guard had disappeared. Possibly they could have been turned against the government instead, at some other time. The sanctions had a negative effect on the Iraqi people. They lost their power because tere was not enough food so they could not use their minds to organise resistance. Instead the sanctions strengthened Saddam. He lived well.
“We gathered by the statue. It was an unbelievable and emotional moment. We were happy because felling the statue marked the start of a new chapter. We were so optimistic. At first 90% of my hopefulness was fulfilled; now it is about 30%. But I am still optimistic. Many doors of hope are still open. 30% is enough for me to keep working.
“For example, my first opinion on the Governing Council was that we should support them and give them a chance to serve and to provide humanitarian assistance. But unfortunately after a few months the GC failed to deal with many issues. People no longer trust them. They lost the trust; they have no role anymore. They have used their power to build their own parties, not to build the country, not to work as leaders.
“They have benefited from hundreds of millions of dollars through contracts and used it to build their own parties and put their relatives in charge of ministries. The children’s hospitals are miserable. They are under threat because of the GC, because the GC is not working to help them. They are dealers, not politicians.”
The contracts issue makes him angry. “They must deal with the contracts issue fairly and Iraqi companies should have a share. They are not getting enough of a share now. With the mobile phones, for example, the company is foreign. No Iraqi company has a share and they deal badly with Iraqis. The signal is bad, the network is bad. When you buy a card for $30, almost $10 is for the line rental and the calls are expensive and the handset and the line.
“There are a lot of problems with the contracts. They should be managed by independent Iraqis, not by the Governing Council. The GC takes bribes for contracts or gives them to its own companies. Iraq needs an independent media enterprise as well. The media is controlled by the GC. They pay under the table for favourable reports and tell them what to cover. It is bad for democracy.
“The members of the Governing Council are the first reason for the attacks in Iraq because they have their own militias, which is against democracy and civil rights. They are threatening people in the street, spreading terrorism, spreading false information to Bremer and he bases his decisions on it.”
Jawdat is now a leader of the Iraqi Democratic Conference, a coalition of 192 of Iraq’s approximately 250 political parties. Their shared purpose is to build a political coalition to take part in the new parliament or national assembly, to make positive changes and play a role in the political future. A three month research programme on alternatives for the leadership of Iraq included a three day, six session conference to which Bremer and other representatives of the CPA were invited.
They didn’t bother to participate, not to come and introduce themselves and meet the representatives of almost 80% of Iraq’s political parties. “Many of us were political prisoners under the old government but none of tem came for dialogue with us. Life can’t go on like this. The CPA doesn’t respect us. Bremer meets only Chalabi and Alawi, who are ugly to Iraqis. Actually I don’t oppose them. The CPA has a right to support them but it must deal fairly with all of us.”
It is of course arguable that the CPA has only a very limited right to give its support to a couple of individuals and to refuse to consult with the leaders of the majority of parties in the country, but Jawdat needs and wants to stay positive so he gives them a lot of leeway.
“I was an opposition leader since 1991 and we suffered for a long time but when I came back on April 9th, I saw some of them, some of those who are now part of the Governing Council, holding guns to defend Saddam Hussein. A former intelligence officer and a high ranking Baath party member became GC members. Some of the GC left forty years ago. They did not suffer with us. How come they became members of the GC? They are not eligible.
“Most Iraqis hate Chalabi. He’s a criminal. Too many civilians have been killed by his militia after liberation, at checkpoints, in attacks. They stole property, money, cars, through looting and confiscation. The US supports Chalabi and Alawi because they cooperate with the administration but they are also associated with bad things which bring the US administration no credit.”
On the troubles of the last couple of days he again points to the passing of misinformation by GC members to Bremer. “They say Moqtada Al Sadr did this, Moqtada Al-Sadr did that. I’m not defending him, but the rights of innocent people. You cannot blame all the bad things on Moqtada Al-Sadr and his followers. There are many bad people in Iraq, as anywhere, but Bremer acts on the bad information.” He doesn’t know exactly why Moqtada’s newspaper was closed. There is no media legislation yet, nothing to specify what can and cannot be done.
Jawdat explained that the law is weak. While he thinks the law is the appropriate way to deal with the problems, he pointed out that the courts are barely functioning and are still controlled by former Baathists, millions of whom are still in power. “The solution is to deal with all cases individually. The Baath party ruled for thirty five years. Some of the old members are just normal Iraqi citizens and some are not and should be deposed.
“The Iraqis know each other. There would have to be an office in the ministries to collect and filter information, to avoid acting on false information. It happened a little at first but some of the GC were firmly against it so now it has almost disappeared. Bremer needs to deal with all the political parties and listen to more channels instead of accepting this misinformation. He must read everything to make the right decision.”
Jawdat is now head of a relief organisation called Freedom Organisation for Iraqi Children which is in fact concerned with taking sick children overseas for urgent medical treatment which they can’t get in Iraq any more, and not apparently related to freedom at all. I met him through a woman called Hind who did some translating for us before the war, who was then working as a translator for FOIC and asked me to elp tem contact the British consul, which is how I came to be discussing statue toppling and the new constitution with the leader of the Iraqi Democratic Conference in his office in the Sheraton Hotel.
On the constitution, he says there are gaps and mistakes and two major problems. The first is religious federalism. He was in favour of local and regional federalism but feels that the version created by the interim constitution, based on race and religion, is divisive. Secondly it gave a power of veto to a minority group, the Kurds. “Iraq has been ruled by a minority since the state was established. There are other minorities, Turkomens, Christians, Yazidis, Assyrians who are not protected and one with a power of veto.”
Perhaps surprisingly, for a man who dislikes the Governing Council so much, he’s not in favour of elections yet. “It would be no good because Iraqis are not practised so they would vote for someone according to religion or emotion and destroy everything. It would be better to wait and educate people through democratic institutions, television, radio, meetings.
“I say no to the Governing Council and no to elections. We should hold an election conference in each village and town and city to choose a national assembly, to choose who should go up from each village to the town and the city and up to the province and up to the capital. There might be a representative for each hundred thousand Iraqis, or some other number, from a conference in each place which would give more opportunity to discuss, rather than simply voting.”
“I joined the Iraqi opposition in the north, organising in secret political cells until 1996 when I was captured after the unsuccessful uprising. We asked the US forces who were operating in the north to provide air cover for us because we could take the cities but we couldn’t hold them without air cover because they had given helicopters to the Iraqi government.
“They promised us air cover and we made a successful attack on the Republican Guard at Kirkuk but they did not give us the air cover. Saddam’s army counter attacked, surrounded and seized the city of Erbil. It was a terrible day. We lost about two hundred resistance fighters. I was captured by the intelligence services on November 25th 1996.
“The first six months in jail I was tortured. The two years in jail were very bad to me because there were bad psychological conditions and bad food. The Red Cross elped a lot, tracking me from jail to jail, keeping a file on me, asking about my situation, bringing me letters from my family. They arranged a visit with my wife and brought me books and clothes and toiletries. There were some procedures but they were allowed access to me.”
Released on July 7th 1998, after 20 months in prison, Jawdat and his family crossed the border into Syria on foot, a twelve hour walk, then travelled by car and bus from the first village into Damascus, where he claimed political asylum to the US. Several of the detainees from the 1996 uprising were released at the same time in some kind of amnesty. “I was not a criminal. I was a politician. I was not charged with any crime.”
Arriving in the US, he studied English and computing part time and Portland Community College and worked for a computer company for a year and a half before setting up his own computer business with his younger brother who left Iraq with him.
Despite the double betrayal by the US, when he heard about the Free Iraq Force through the e mail and telephone network of Iraqi opposition members, he volunteered for the exile militia which would train in Hungary and travel into Iraq with the US troops. “It was a different situation from 1991 and 1996. It was their decision to enter Iraq then so I believed they would carry it through, unlike the other times when it was our decision and we asked for their support.”
On April 9th they drove into Baghdad on tanks, making straight for Firdos Square and the Saddam statue next to the Palestine Hotel which then housed the entire international press. “The army and Republican Guard had disappeared. Possibly they could have been turned against the government instead, at some other time. The sanctions had a negative effect on the Iraqi people. They lost their power because tere was not enough food so they could not use their minds to organise resistance. Instead the sanctions strengthened Saddam. He lived well.
“We gathered by the statue. It was an unbelievable and emotional moment. We were happy because felling the statue marked the start of a new chapter. We were so optimistic. At first 90% of my hopefulness was fulfilled; now it is about 30%. But I am still optimistic. Many doors of hope are still open. 30% is enough for me to keep working.
“For example, my first opinion on the Governing Council was that we should support them and give them a chance to serve and to provide humanitarian assistance. But unfortunately after a few months the GC failed to deal with many issues. People no longer trust them. They lost the trust; they have no role anymore. They have used their power to build their own parties, not to build the country, not to work as leaders.
“They have benefited from hundreds of millions of dollars through contracts and used it to build their own parties and put their relatives in charge of ministries. The children’s hospitals are miserable. They are under threat because of the GC, because the GC is not working to help them. They are dealers, not politicians.”
The contracts issue makes him angry. “They must deal with the contracts issue fairly and Iraqi companies should have a share. They are not getting enough of a share now. With the mobile phones, for example, the company is foreign. No Iraqi company has a share and they deal badly with Iraqis. The signal is bad, the network is bad. When you buy a card for $30, almost $10 is for the line rental and the calls are expensive and the handset and the line.
“There are a lot of problems with the contracts. They should be managed by independent Iraqis, not by the Governing Council. The GC takes bribes for contracts or gives them to its own companies. Iraq needs an independent media enterprise as well. The media is controlled by the GC. They pay under the table for favourable reports and tell them what to cover. It is bad for democracy.
“The members of the Governing Council are the first reason for the attacks in Iraq because they have their own militias, which is against democracy and civil rights. They are threatening people in the street, spreading terrorism, spreading false information to Bremer and he bases his decisions on it.”
Jawdat is now a leader of the Iraqi Democratic Conference, a coalition of 192 of Iraq’s approximately 250 political parties. Their shared purpose is to build a political coalition to take part in the new parliament or national assembly, to make positive changes and play a role in the political future. A three month research programme on alternatives for the leadership of Iraq included a three day, six session conference to which Bremer and other representatives of the CPA were invited.
They didn’t bother to participate, not to come and introduce themselves and meet the representatives of almost 80% of Iraq’s political parties. “Many of us were political prisoners under the old government but none of tem came for dialogue with us. Life can’t go on like this. The CPA doesn’t respect us. Bremer meets only Chalabi and Alawi, who are ugly to Iraqis. Actually I don’t oppose them. The CPA has a right to support them but it must deal fairly with all of us.”
It is of course arguable that the CPA has only a very limited right to give its support to a couple of individuals and to refuse to consult with the leaders of the majority of parties in the country, but Jawdat needs and wants to stay positive so he gives them a lot of leeway.
“I was an opposition leader since 1991 and we suffered for a long time but when I came back on April 9th, I saw some of them, some of those who are now part of the Governing Council, holding guns to defend Saddam Hussein. A former intelligence officer and a high ranking Baath party member became GC members. Some of the GC left forty years ago. They did not suffer with us. How come they became members of the GC? They are not eligible.
“Most Iraqis hate Chalabi. He’s a criminal. Too many civilians have been killed by his militia after liberation, at checkpoints, in attacks. They stole property, money, cars, through looting and confiscation. The US supports Chalabi and Alawi because they cooperate with the administration but they are also associated with bad things which bring the US administration no credit.”
On the troubles of the last couple of days he again points to the passing of misinformation by GC members to Bremer. “They say Moqtada Al Sadr did this, Moqtada Al-Sadr did that. I’m not defending him, but the rights of innocent people. You cannot blame all the bad things on Moqtada Al-Sadr and his followers. There are many bad people in Iraq, as anywhere, but Bremer acts on the bad information.” He doesn’t know exactly why Moqtada’s newspaper was closed. There is no media legislation yet, nothing to specify what can and cannot be done.
Jawdat explained that the law is weak. While he thinks the law is the appropriate way to deal with the problems, he pointed out that the courts are barely functioning and are still controlled by former Baathists, millions of whom are still in power. “The solution is to deal with all cases individually. The Baath party ruled for thirty five years. Some of the old members are just normal Iraqi citizens and some are not and should be deposed.
“The Iraqis know each other. There would have to be an office in the ministries to collect and filter information, to avoid acting on false information. It happened a little at first but some of the GC were firmly against it so now it has almost disappeared. Bremer needs to deal with all the political parties and listen to more channels instead of accepting this misinformation. He must read everything to make the right decision.”
Jawdat is now head of a relief organisation called Freedom Organisation for Iraqi Children which is in fact concerned with taking sick children overseas for urgent medical treatment which they can’t get in Iraq any more, and not apparently related to freedom at all. I met him through a woman called Hind who did some translating for us before the war, who was then working as a translator for FOIC and asked me to elp tem contact the British consul, which is how I came to be discussing statue toppling and the new constitution with the leader of the Iraqi Democratic Conference in his office in the Sheraton Hotel.
On the constitution, he says there are gaps and mistakes and two major problems. The first is religious federalism. He was in favour of local and regional federalism but feels that the version created by the interim constitution, based on race and religion, is divisive. Secondly it gave a power of veto to a minority group, the Kurds. “Iraq has been ruled by a minority since the state was established. There are other minorities, Turkomens, Christians, Yazidis, Assyrians who are not protected and one with a power of veto.”
Perhaps surprisingly, for a man who dislikes the Governing Council so much, he’s not in favour of elections yet. “It would be no good because Iraqis are not practised so they would vote for someone according to religion or emotion and destroy everything. It would be better to wait and educate people through democratic institutions, television, radio, meetings.
“I say no to the Governing Council and no to elections. We should hold an election conference in each village and town and city to choose a national assembly, to choose who should go up from each village to the town and the city and up to the province and up to the capital. There might be a representative for each hundred thousand Iraqis, or some other number, from a conference in each place which would give more opportunity to discuss, rather than simply voting.”